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REPLY
William J. Stuntz*

It is common ground in Fourth Amendment law and literature
that the law should protect privacy, that its primary purpose should
be to regulate what police officers can see and ·hear. I believe this
view is mistaken, for reasons that emerge nicely when one thinks
about how the privacy norm would affect the law outside criminal
procedure. If we took seriously the things courts say in Fourth
Amendment cases and tried to apply them to everything the government does (instead of applying them only to the police), we
would soon find ourselves in the constitutional world of 1905. If
there is something wrong with the constitutional order of the Lochner era, there must be something wrong with focusing the law of
police investigation on privacy. It would be better if the law were
to emphasize the one thing that most distinguishes the police from
other government officials: the police use force, sometimes violent
force, on individual citizens.
I think Professor Seidman agrees with all this. 1 We disagree
mainly about how far the law has already traveled along the path
from guarding privacy to regulating coercion. Even there, our disagreement is only partial: both of us note that the Fifth Amendment
has largely made this shift,2 and both of us note that the Fourth
Amendment tends not to apply except in situations in which there
is a coercive confrontation between a police officer and a suspect.3
Perhaps, as Seidman suggests, these patterns show that the law does
not really worry about privacy anymore. But I doubt it. The key
point here is what Fourth Amendment law does in cases in which it
applies. The Fourth Amendment regulates street stops, but it pays
little attention to how coercively the police behave in those stops instead, the law concerns itself with whether and when the police
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1. See Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with Privacy's Problem, 93 MICH. L. REV.

1079, 1081, 1087-92 (1995).
2. Id. at 1082-84; William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. RBv. 1016, 1068-71. (1995).
3. See Seidman, supra note 1, at 1090-92; Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1056-57, 1071 & n.200.
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can look in suspects' pockets.4 So too, the law limits police officers'
ability to enter people's houses but turns a blind eye to how violently the cops behave once inside.5 I try to demonstrate these
points in my article, and I won't rehash the examples here. Suffice
it to say that the law gives the police a lot more incentive to worry
about where they look than about how roughly they treat the
targets of their attention. Searches are a bigger deal in Fourth
Amendment law than seizures, even seizures ·of people. This is a
consequence of courts thinking primarily about privacy, about people's ability to keep secrets, instead of about what makes the police
a potential danger in a free society - the fact that they have guns
and clubs and can use them.
The second half of Seidman's essay raises a different and
broader point. Seidman contends that the very idea of protecting a
private sphere cannot survive legal realism, for one cannot tell what
is "private" without some baseline, and the realists showed that no
baseline is more natural than any other. Once government power
extends potentially to everything, the government can extort "consent" to anything. When the greater power is all-encompassing,
and when the greater power usually includes the lesser, there is no
stopping the exercise of lesser powers.6
Seidman may be right about all this. (Though there are ways of
limiting lesser powers. As Seth Kreimer has shown, the law can
adopt baselines other than potential government authority - for
example, one might ask whether, if the lesser power were denied,
the government really might exercise the greater power.7 This
amounts to asking whether the government is using its power as a
bluff. The question is quite similar to what the law asks in contract
duress cases, or in blackmail cases.) And if Seidman is right, I agree
that his point devastates any theory of constitutional privacy
protection.
But the baselines problem cannot devastate all constitutional
regulation of the police. Even in a world in which the public-pri4. Thus, as I note in the article, the law requires a greater justification for ordering a
suspect to empty his jacket pockets than for seizing him at gunpoint See Stuntz, supra note
2, at 1065-66.
5. See id. at 1066-68.
6. See Seidman, supra note 1, at 1094-1099.
7. See Seth F. Kreimer, A/locational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L REv. 1293, 1371-74 (1984). For an application of this part of
Kreimer's argument to some Fourth Amendment problems, see Wtlliam J. Stuntz, Implicit
Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth ~mendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553, 567-76
(1992).
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vate distinction has collapsed, the government is not free to shoot
its citizens or to club them on the street. Violence is not the government's right but something to be used sparingly, and only for the
right sorts of reasons. Regulating violence casts no doubt on the
constitutionality of the regulatory state, becaus~ the regulatory
state tends to exercise its power in less than violent ways. Thus,
focusing the law of police investigation on coercion and violence
does not raise the same kinds of difficulties as protecting the sanctity of briefcases and glove compartments. In particular, it does not
fall prey to the kinds of realist attacks that Sejdman raises in his
interesting essay. We are left with the proposition that using the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to protect privacy cannot work, but
using them to limit coercion and violence can. In other words, the
sensible course of action - worrying about what the police can do
to people rather than what they can see - is also the only course of
action that doesn't collide with the rest of our constitutional order.

